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Abstract
Dominant electricity systems are inevitably transitioning into new forms in terms of power generation mix, mode of en-
ergy system governance and vested interests, the extent of state and consumer/citizen participation in the energy system,
and energy justice expectations in different geographies in the Global North and Global South. In this editorial to the the-
matic issue entitled Politics and (Self-)Organisation of Electricity System Transitions in a Global North–South Perspective,
we discuss politics and (self)-organisation of (just) energy transitions to expose how messy, convoluted, and fluid future
electricity system transitions can be in both the Global North and Global South.
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1. Global Decarbonisation and the Role of the
Electricity Sector
The destructive consequence of fossil fuel consumption
is now self-evident. Causal mechanisms and scientific re-
medial measures are well known and yet the proposed
decarbonisation initiatives seem either far-fetched or
run the risk of adventuring into an arena of obscurities,
uncertainties, and ambivalences. In cases where decar-
bonisation initiatives are fairly straightforward and per-
haps seamless, debates about the choice of pathways
that would produce just outcomes raise more questions
than answers. Carbon lock-ins are indisputable in critical
sectors such as the electricity and transport sector, heavy
industries, as well as the aviation and shipping industries.
The consensus to keep the global average annual tem-
perature rise to well below 2°C and even aspire to re-
duce it further down to 1.5°C—as stipulated in the Paris
Climate Agreement reached in 2015—may have pro-
vided a timely inspiration and execution plan for future
decarbonisation. Yet there clearly exist inconsistencies
between the carbon emission trajectories, planned emis-
sion reductions, and required emission reduction targets
of all countries, not excluding the so-called “climate pro-
gressive” nations (see Anderson, Broderick, & Stoddard,
2020). The energy industry alone contributes over 40%
of global carbon emissions (International Energy Agency,
2020), and so the claim that the Paris-compliant global
carbon budget requires complete decarbonisation by
2030–2045 (Anderson et al., 2020) suggests a radical
transformation of the society, the economy and gov-
ernance of energy systems across the world in less
than three decades. The backtracking of wealthy na-
tions from the Paris Climate Agreement (e.g., USA under
President D. Trump), display of carbon lock-in syndromes,
and/or structural contradictions in decarbonisation dec-
larations among champions of sustainable energy tran-
sitions (Germany, UK, Sweden, and Norway) and obvi-
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ous reluctance of coal-dependent European countries
(Germany, Czech Republic, and Poland) to honour coal
phase-out pledges (Europe Beyond Coal, 2019; Osička
et al., 2020) speak louder than the popular adage. In
other words, it is easier said than done. These wealthy
western countries may have failed to exhibit exemplary
behaviours in the transition to decarbonised energy sys-
tems due to structural and circumstantial constraints
over which they have limited or no control. What ap-
pears intriguing, however, is the continuous promotion
of low-carbon energy solutions in Global South countries
where the technology is neither cost-effective nor eas-
ily compatible with their politics, energy system, socio-
economic conditions, and the energy visions of different
social groups (Boamah, 2020b). This double-standard or
perverse approach to sustainable energy transition has
been described as “energy bullying” (Monyei, Jenkins,
Serestina, & Adewumi, 2018; see also Boamah, 2020b).
The greater contribution of ‘climate progressive coun-
tries’ to global carbon emissions—compared to devel-
oping countries—places non-negotiablemoral and politi-
cal responsibilities on them in global decarbonisation ini-
tiatives. In fact, many developing countries do not feel
morally obliged to implement renewable energy tech-
nologies unless they are cost-effective and fit seamlessly
into their overarching socio-economic developmentmas-
ter plans (Boamah, 2020b). The term ‘energy bullying’
could perhaps be an apt description to foreground jus-
tice considerations in the transition to low-carbon en-
ergy technologies. However, although least-developed
countries are the primary victims of climate change im-
pacts, a number of them (e.g., Indonesia, Philippines) are
equally guilty of heavy carbon emissions, and thus, can-
not shun their contribution to global climate change mit-
igation efforts solely on claims of ‘energy bullying’ by the
Global North.
The pathways to decarbonisation remain convoluted
and debatable in both theGlobal North andGlobal South.
Climate scientists may have their say while politics and
modes of energy governance drive decarbonisation ini-
tiatives in opposite directions, especially in the shipping,
aviation, and heavy industry sectors where further de-
carbonisation options are either limited or too expen-
sive. Of course, there is no single ‘silver bullet’ solution
to this quandary of the Anthropocene and so the de-
bate should rather be focused on identifying the most
promising entry point for the discussion of trade-offs in
decarbonisation pathways—of the menu of available op-
tions. Electricity reaches approximately 4.3 billion peo-
ple, and the sector constitutes the single largest source
of aggregate greenhouse gas emissions in most coun-
tries, predictably the fastest growing energy sector of
the future. Moreover, the emergence of electric cars
makes the sector a promising decarbonisation pathway
(Sovacool & Walter, 2019). The electricity sector cer-
tainly has important roles to play in decarbonisation ini-
tiatives, especially given recent advancements in low-
carbon energy technologies and their capacity to com-
plement fossil fuel-dependent, centralised electricity sys-
tems which are currently losing their appeal in favour of
decentralised electricity options in both theGlobal North
and Global South (Boamah, 2020b; Bouffard & Kirschen,
2008; Taylor, Turner, Willette, & Uawithya, 2015). Two is-
sues are noteworthy in the discussion of the choice of
electricity transition pathways from among the count-
less available options. The first crucial issue is the direc-
tion and nature of the transition process, which would
be more appealing in both the short- and the long-term.
Put differently, this is whether to maintain the status
quo or switch between decentralised, fully, or partly cen-
tralised systems, on the one hand; and the political and
socio-economic impacts of the transition pathway cho-
sen, on the other hand. The next and related crucial issue
is whether the decarbonisation process should be self-
driven, state-driven, and/or context-driven. The ambiva-
lence over the potential of (un)just energy transition cuts
across both of these issues. In other words, which elec-
tricity system transition should be chosen, with regards
to where, when, for whom, with what consequences for
the economy and fossil fuel consumption, and in order
to escape which kind of entanglements?
2. Highlights from the Four Articles and Our Argument
The four articles in this thematic issue sought to en-
gage with the aforementioned issues, and the conclu-
sions reached in all articles suggest electricity system
transition pathways are rather less predictable, nested,
and in a state of constant flux. As shown in the arti-
cles, the socio-economic and ecological impacts of the
direction of electricity system transition would depend
on local circumstances and a complex set of conditions,
e.g., in Kenya and Turkey. And even in cases of obvious
transition towards decentralised electricity systems, the
co-existence of both systems is still inevitable and de-
sirable. Furthermore, transitioning to energy efficiency
technologies like electric vehicles (EVs) does not auto-
matically guarantee desirable decarbonisation pathways
(e.g., in Germany) and decentralised electricity transition
is not always driven by defossilisation considerations, es-
pecially in Norway where the electricity sector is already
fully decarbonised. The issue of just energy transition
becomes even more complicated when entitlement no-
tions, development priorities, and aspirations of differ-
ent countries are compared and put in context. We dis-
cuss in this editorial politics and (self)-organisation of
(just) energy transitions to expose how messy, convo-
luted, and fluid future electricity system transitions can
be in both the Global North and Global South.
3. Centralised–Decentralised Electricity System
Dichotomy, Self-Organisation, and Just Energy
Transition
Centralised electricity systems, which have dominated
the electricity regime in most countries for decades,
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depend on fossil fuel-powered generation plants. The
governance mode of these systems limits the capacity
of consumers to produce energy and proactively miti-
gate power supply shortfalls and unreliable power sup-
ply. The mainstream discourse of the Anthropocene and
characteristic features of a centralised electricity sys-
tem are rendering this dominant power supply paradigm
less desirable mainly due to the fast depletion of fos-
sil fuels and attendant negative climate change impacts.
Furthermore, the desire of investors to minimise risks
through the deployment of smaller-scale,modular gener-
ation and transmission systems, as well as public reserva-
tions about system corruption, gross inefficiencies, and
other uncertainties play a role in this tendency (Boamah,
2020b; Bouffard & Kirschen, 2008). Small-scale decen-
tralised systems are emerging as suitable alternatives or
complements to centralised systems. They are mostly
based on renewable energy technologies or on high-
efficiency fossil fuel-based technologies such as com-
bined heat and power or have the capacity to use di-
verse sources of energy simultaneously, thereby miti-
gating many power generation and supply uncertainties
(Bouffard & Kirschen, 2008). The flexibility and oppor-
tunity to integrate renewable technologies to drive de-
carbonisation initiatives add vitality to calls for a radical
transition towards decentralised electricity systems par-
ticularly in Global North countries generating high car-
bon emissions and urgently seeking tomitigate their high
carbon footprints out of ‘ecological guilt’—primarily per
moral considerations.
Meanwhile in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, over
800 million people live without electricity access (World
Bank, 2019). In these geographies, a single focus on state-
led centralised electrical grid extension to territorially re-
mote and lower-income locations is either unfeasible or
costly. The transition to flexible, commercially viable, and
scalable decentralised electricity systems seems to be the
obvious option to move toward in the near future (Banal-
Estañol, Calzada, & Jordana, 2017; Bisaga & Parikh, 2018;
Taylor et al., 2015). Another important avenue for decar-
bonisation is the energy efficiency measures and/or prac-
tices that result in reduction of energy demand as well
as the transition to EVs or heat pumps (Geels, Sovacool,
& Sorell, 2018). It is worth clarifying that the term self-
organised, decentralised system used here denotes a
system of energy generation and distribution primar-
ily initiated, owned and/or predominantly financed by
users themselves rather than the state, parastatals or pri-
vate companies and where electrical power is generated
from (local) sources other than conventional centralised
grid systems. Self-organisation of energy therefore en-
compasses embedded generation or net metering, pri-
vate sector-driven mini-grid electrification, and complete
stand-alone solar photovoltaic (PV) systems where even
regulatory frameworks and incentives are driven by the
state, parastatals, or by private companies.
The transition to self-organised decentralised elec-
tricity provision has gained much prominence in the
Global North (e.g., Germany, UK, Switzerland, Australia,
Norway, Spain, and some areas in the USA), primarily
to encourage the transition to low-carbon energy solu-
tions (Bach, Hopkins, & Stephenson, 2020; Dharshing,
2017; Inderberg, Tews, & Turner, 2018; Passey, Watt,
Bruce, & MacGill, 2018; Schmid, Pechan, Mehnert, &
Eisenack, 2017). Particularly prominent is the emerging
phenomenon of electricity users simultaneously becom-
ing consumers and producers of electricity—often re-
ferred to as ‘prosumers’—using small-scale solar PV sys-
tems as well as offset electricity tariffs usually with cen-
tralised grid connection. The deployment of these sys-
tems facilitates effective involvement of users in electric-
ity provision by sharing excess power—produced from
renewable sources—with the grid and other electricity
users, supports peak load demand management, energy
systemefficiency and plays a vital role in ensuring reliable
and sustainable electricity supply in the future (Inderberg
et al., 2018; Razzaq, Zafar, Khan, Butt, &Mahmood, 2016;
Zafar et al., 2018). While the potential contributions of
decentralised, self-organised electrification systems to
decarbonisation and the empowerment of consumers
are pretty clear, the expectation that particular transi-
tion pathways would ipso facto produce just outcomes
for all groups, communities, and sectors of the economy
in different geographies is still debatable. The ‘just en-
ergy transition’ approach entails a critical discussion of
the social, economic, and political repercussions of de-
carbonised energy transition or decarbonisation strate-
gies to avoid potential re-production of exploitation in
the quest to eschew carbon lock-in (Healy & Barry, 2017;
Unruh, 2002; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013). Studies show
that decentralised systems grant consumers some auton-
omy, provide increases in the uptake of low-carbon en-
ergy technologies, alter the political power wielded by
energy companies, and still have the tendency to create
social inequalities in favour of more affluent groups who
can afford and undermine the operation of conventional
energy players who may lose customers (Brisbois, 2019;
de Wildt, Chappin, van de Kaa, Herder, & van de Poel,
2020; Sovacool, Lipson, & Chard, 2019). The transition
to prosuming will reconfigure the electric utility sector
towards low-carbon solutions with many unpredictable
risks, and so policymakers and planners are advised to
proactively consider effective and efficient measures for
their entry into competitive electricity markets (Parag &
Sovacool, 2016). As promising as this sounds, the implica-
tions for just outcomes remain open to question. Another
conundrum is that most Global South countries are tran-
sitioning towards a decentralised paradigm primarily to
complement centralised power supply systems and mit-
igate the accompanying spatial inequalities. Accordingly,
decarbonisation is the least important consideration for
the transition. Whereas the wealthy carbon-dependent
Global North countries are compelled decarbonised their
energy systems out of moral and political obligations.
The most crucial motivating factors behind the tran-
sition processes, entitlement notions, and other contex-
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tual conditions in specific geographies deserve attention
here since different transition pathways are possible. In
Norway, for example, where electricity prices are rela-
tively low, and centralised electricity generation is sig-
nificantly based on renewables, the transition to self-
organised grid-connected solar PV systems may be less
inspiring (in the future). At least out of ecological sus-
tainability and financial concerns since the electricity sec-
tor is already cost-effectively “de-carbonised” compared
to that of Germany, and UK, for example (see Inderberg
et al., 2018). This does not suggest a seamless transition
in Norway, as shown by Inderberg (2020) in this volume.
The grid companies and their interest organisations cer-
tainly still hold key positions but their interests have be-
come increasingly less unified since 2011. Higher frag-
mentation is likely to yield reduced political influence.
On the other hand, the grid companies have endorsed
the idea of nationally determined regulations. Although
depending on the details, the policies analysed either
favour or discourage further developments toward de-
centralised electricity systems, Inderberg (2020) sug-
gests that the centralisation–decentralisation dichotomy
obscuresmany nuances involved on three accounts. First,
decentralising initiatives in the energy system can go
hand in hand with centralised political steering. It is
pretty clear that nationally mandated initiatives have de-
veloped digitalisation and prosuming provisions thatmay
lead to increased decentralisation. Second, this complex-
ity underlines the fact that a rough categorisation of ac-
tors into incumbents and new entrants is not sufficiently
fine-tuned: Analysis of decentralisation requires signifi-
cantly more refined categorisation and contextualisation
to enable more precise predictions. Thirdly, transitioning
includes several development paths, which may lead to
diverging interpretations. Even though Norwegian elec-
tricity sector is fully decarbonised, there are still several
different transitions underway. This indicates that even
in countries where much of the policy drive is mandated
by a decarbonisation goal, subtler causal agents are likely
to exist. It is, therefore, necessary to contextualise and
make a nuanced analysis to clarify factors influencing on-
going energy transitions, paying a keen attention to path-
way directionality complexities as well as the energy jus-
tice implications of the ongoing changes.
Developments in Germany are not straightforward ei-
ther. Carbon emissions from the road transport sector
are still significant and so the transition from fossil fuel
vehicles to EVs has been featured an as important de-
carbonisation initiative. Since early 2010, the German
government implemented a series of measures to pro-
mote the use of EVs, including purchase subsidies and
the development of charging infrastructures. The article
by Zink, Valdes, and With (2020) discusses the impact of
an increasing share of EVs on the electricity grid and suit-
able locations for charging stations with examples from
a case study in Lower Bavaria. The impact of purchase
subsidies on EV purchases in Germany, a high-income
country characterised by an important automotive indus-
try and an increasing share of private vehicles, is also ex-
amined. The authors conclude that neither an increasing
electrical charging infrastructure nor EV subsidy policies
are sufficient in accelerating EVs transition per se. And
even if the two conditions did facilitate the transition,
they still do notwarrant successful decarbonisation since
Germany generates approximately 30% of its electricity
from coal. The overall effect of the EV transition must be
set in relation to the nature of the country’s power gen-
eration mix and the fraction that may be constituted by
renewable energy sources in the future. Also, it should be
pointed out that the total carbon dioxide balance of EV
production (e.g., the battery system) can cast doubts on
the proposed climate neutrality associated with the tran-
sition from fossil fuel-powered cars to the electric types.
Socio-economic conditions and political systems in
Turkey make the co-existence of centralised and decen-
tralised systems more desirable, as shown in Dolunay’s
article (2020). Instead of approaching centralised or de-
centralised transitions as two separate paths, in which
an entire energy system and/or institutional structure
need to be revised accordingly, partially managed mod-
els could provide faster transitions to renewable energy
and enable practical solutions for people. Indeed, from
a technical perspective, a centralised grid-connected en-
ergy system is a combination of many decentralised en-
ergy systems into a grid. Depending on the particular
sources of social power in a country, region, or govern-
ment as discussed in this article, a different model of re-
newable transition with different layers of liberalisation,
privatisation, or self-organisation is also possible. This
could in some cases facilitate a faster renewable tran-
sition than purely centralised or decentralised options.
The organisation of the (de)centralised electricity transi-
tions are dependent on the history, geography, and the
overlapping relations of these sources of social power.
Nevertheless, the answer to the question of who is pre-
pared to take responsibility within a given country will
determine how social power will play out in renewable
energy transitions.
In the foregoing, analysis of geographies of self-
organisation and just energy transition notions are nec-
essary to expose the nature and cause of conundrums
and conflicting perspectives surrounding electricity sys-
tem transition in different geographies. Self-organisation
is seen as a way of institutionalising new social rela-
tionships deriving from (or establishing) a variety of lo-
cal networks, which potentially offer new pathways for
the emergence of ‘alternative forms of governance.’ It
is achieved through encounters—perhaps of a serendip-
itous nature—that lead to the identification of mu-
tual interests, positions, and relations based on shared
space, knowledge, values, and norms (Atkinson, Dörfler,
& Rothfuß, 2018, p. 2). Fundamentally, self-organisation
is a way of representing processes that institutionalise
the social relationships deriving from a variety of local
networks. These interactions initially generate trust de-
rived from individual relationships which, over time and
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through further interactions, become transformed into
collective forms of trust and create practice(s) with ‘col-
lective intentionality’ (Hasanov & Beaumont, 2016). This
does not imply that they operate in an ‘anarchical’ man-
ner as they have to institutionalise some of their proce-
dures, although they always try to uphold a certain ‘flu-
idity’ and openness of social processes and internal in-
novation. However, self-organisation can take on many
different forms as it develops within local and regional
contexts in response to locally experienced and defined
‘problems.’ Given this, in attempting to identify a some-
what general ‘definition’ of self-organisation, we need
to exercise caution. There are multiple ways of concep-
tualising self-organisation that are not necessarily mutu-
ally exclusive. Two examples will suffice to illustrate this
(see Atkinson et al., 2018, p. 170). Nederhand, Bekkers,
and Voorberg (2016, p. 2) define self-organisation as a
“collective process of communication, choice, and mu-
tual adjustment of behaviour resulting in the emergence
of ordered structures”; while for Boonstra and Boelens
(2011) it is the absence of government involvement, and
thus, of external control (see also Boonstra, 2015).Wedo
not see these two approaches as necessarily contradic-
tory. However, we should also acknowledge that some
forms of self-organising may consciously choose not to
engage with established forms of governance, indeed
they may seek to demonstrate that there are alterna-
tive ways of organising society. Meerkerk, van Boonstra,
& Edelenbos (2013) point out that self-organised initia-
tives represent a challenge to existing governance struc-
tures yet evolve together within existing institutional set-
tings. We want to argue that the most fruitful way of
doing this and of understanding self-organising is a dis-
cursive approach that identifies particular ‘local issues,’
‘frames of orientations,’ and which develops associated
narratives, visions and practices and then seeks to con-
struct particular courses of action—appropriate to local
contexts. Here self-organising is a dynamic process that
emerges in response to the development of shared local
understandings and ways of addressing these (Rothfuß
& Korff, 2015). Moreover, as the experience and knowl-
edge of such groups evolve, they themselves are likely to
change and, perhaps, expand their horizons beyond local
contexts, making connections with wider national and
global causal processes. Self-organisation as a means of
action ‘from below’ emphasises interaction and discus-
sion between participants leading to the identification of
relevant local issues and the formation of an accompany-
ing ‘discourse/narrative’ of problem definition that may
challenge and subvert existing governance forms or en-
hance them. It provides alternative ways of doing things,
it potentially offers new ways of ‘governing from be-
low’ that reflect local contexts, understandings of prob-
lems, and solves them through innovative practices (see
Joas, 1996).
In the energy transition literature, self-organisation
encompasses a variety of topics ranging from active
participation of the population and local ownership of
projects by citizens and communities in local energy ini-
tiatives to the resultant ‘transformative outcomes’ in the
transition to new energy systems and how these cre-
ate promising avenues to facilitate energy transition to-
wards a low-carbon future (Hasanov & Zuidema, 2018).
Self-organisation of distributed generation in the Global
North, for example, ensures reliable energy supply and
sustainable energy practices, grants some autonomy to
energy users (Bulkeley, Powells, & Bell, 2016; Strengers,
2013; Strengers, Pink,&Nicholls, 2019; Zafar et al., 2018),
not excluding availability of financial incentives, rele-
vant technical information, as well as the existence of
clear regulatory frameworks (Boamah, 2020b).The driv-
ing forces behind self-organisation of energy and their
consequent effects in the Global South vary markedly
not only from experiences in the Global North but also
even within and between countries. Major drivers of
the transition include unjust billing systems, inefficien-
cies in state-driven centralised electricity provision, and
unreliable and unavailable grid power supply particu-
larly in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa,
and many other African countries. Self-organisation of
electricity towards decentralised electrification systems
seems like a promising approach to addressing energy
injustices, and thus, economic challenges in the Global
South. In Africa in particular, self-organised electrifica-
tion initiatives are expressions of despondency, aspira-
tion for autonomy in energy generation and consump-
tion, and thus, remediation responses to energy injus-
tices considered realisable through limited or no depen-
dency on state institutions (Boamah, 2020a, 2020b).
Decentralised, self-organised models of electricity
production have thus been perceived as an opportunity
for countries in the Global South to leapfrog directly
into the future of electricity. That said, in the Global
South where decentralised electricity systems appear as
the better alternative, outcomes of the mode of gover-
nance present yet additional dilemmas. Despite interest
in self-organised decentralised electrification, states are
still ambivalent due to potentially negative effects on
their monopolistic practices. States have strong vested
interests in power generation and aspire to retain sub-
stantial control in centralised electricity provision in or-
der to directly drive their socio-economic development
agenda throughout the country. This is particularly strik-
ing where centralised electricity distribution is struc-
tured around state monopoly primarily for ‘developmen-
tal state’ visions in order to secure revenue flows and/or
in response to a history of unsuccessful private sector-
led development approaches (Boamah, 2020a, 2020b;
Van der Merwe, 2017). Central governmental structures
and parastatals strategically organise decentralised elec-
tricity provisions in a way that keeps citizens perpetu-
ally within the bounds of patronising state-driven elec-
tricity services. Even in South Africa, a country that sup-
ports embedded electricity generation or net metering
through state-driven initiatives—such as tax incentives
and cost reductions to reduce its huge carbon foot-prints
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(Didiza et al., 2016; Van der Merwe, 2017)—regulations
on permissible power exports by net-metered customers
are designed to prioritise the financial sustainability of
state electricity distribution against the interests of cus-
tomerswhowant tomitigate impacts of unjust electricity
provision in ‘self-fulfilling’ ways (Boamah, 2020b).
Similar ambivalence occurs in Ghana and Kenya
where the centralised electricity sector also serves as
the state’s cash-cow and any aberration from this tra-
dition spells financial doom for the state electricity dis-
tributors and the implementation of collectively bind-
ing decisions by the state (Boamah, 2020b, in press).
Kenya Power has reservations against self-organised, de-
centralised electrification systems due to its cyclical fi-
nancial challenges and financial obligations to numer-
ous power producers, sometimes with contracts extend-
ing beyond 20 years (Boamah, 2020a). Unless decen-
tralised electrification systems are organised within the
state apparatus and tailored to specific rural electrifi-
cation visions of the state, decarbonisation considera-
tions through self-organised mechanisms do not present
any practically compelling motivation for the promotion
of self-organised, decentralised initiatives of the popu-
lation. This is especially the case given that renewables
constitute approximately 85% of power generation mix
(43.50% geothermal, 27.61% hydro, and 15.12% wind)
as of May 2019 (Boamah, 2020b) and given the exis-
tence of 3.2 million off-grid solar PV installations as of
December 2017—which aremostly private sector-driven.
Furthermore, neither decentralised nor centralised sys-
tems provide precise instructions for socio-economic
transformation especially for territorially remote areas.
The spatial concentration of centralised electrical
grids in urban and higher-income locations of Kenya af-
fects the development of micro-business enterprises in
remote areas (Boamah, 2020a). Well-to-do households
who invest in more efficient solar PV systems to serve
as power back-up systems are able to satisfy energy
needs for social and business activities even in areas
noted for unreliable grid supply. Poorer households, on
the other hand, have to restrict dominant social and
economic practices according to the energy services of
inefficient solar PV systems, which eventually hinders
the development of home-based and other rural busi-
ness enterprises. The emergence of precautionary en-
ergy practices contributes to unintentional production of
low-carbon landscapes in the periphery but reveals in-
herent injustices associated with complete dependence
on decentralised systems too. This also exposes gover-
nance challenges since decentralised systems are usu-
ally organised with little or no adherence to state regu-
lations and the desperate customers are often exploited
by unscrupulous solar energy service providers (Boamah,
2020a). The governance mode of either centralised or
decentralised electricity systems can play an important
mediating role in terms of impacts on rural livelihoods.
The article by Klagge, Greiner, Greven, and Nweke-Eze
(2020) sheds light on this issue. The types of multilevel
governance in geothermal energy development in Kenya
include institutional interplay, co-management, and the
Geothermal Development Corporation as a bridging or-
ganization. Their study shows that centralised electricity
generation can, as with decentralised electricity systems,
have strong local impacts, with local communities play-
ing an active part. The Baringo community in Kenya, for
instance, is not a passive recipient of benefits but rather
an active participant in negotiations as well as acts of
resistance and sabotage when important demands are
not met or if Geothermal Development Corporation ac-
tivities are regarded as unfair. Community action and re-
sponses, therefore, have the potential to disrupt project
advancement. The conclusion reached by the authors is
that cross-scale links need to be considered to under-
stand how power relations impact the implementation
and governance of large-scale electricity generation.
There are certain distinct motivating factors and fric-
tions in electricity system transitions which are exclu-
sive to particular countries in the Global South. Ghana
is a classic case in point. The strategic handling of tar-
iffs and the quality of electricity supply present govern-
ments with the opportunity to shape the public’s impres-
sion of the ruling government. Ghana experienced acute
power outages caused by power generation shortfalls,
grand energy sector corruption, and controversial tariff
increases between 2012 and 2016. Rampant power out-
ages were satirically represented in the Ghanaian media
as Dumsor whereas ‘hyper-speed’ recording of electric-
ity units by alleged ‘faulty meters’ were termed ‘Usain-
Bolt Meters’ due to public perceptions of unfair billing
systems (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2018; Pyman & Boamah,
2019). Dumsor is a word in the Ghanaian Twi language
which refers to frequent and unexpected power out-
ages within a short period of time. The satirical term
was invented by the frustrated Ghanaians to ridicule the
government’s poor management of energy crises, espe-
cially prior to the general elections in December 2016.
These developments made the incumbent government
unpopular in the run-up to the 2016 general elections.
The Ghanaian government introduced off-grid solar PV
subsidy program primarily to mitigate the energy crisis.
Net metering policy which had been in existence was
given a more serious attention by the government be-
fore the general elections. The net metering sub-code
was published by the Energy Commission in 2015 and
on the 30 September 2016 the Public Utilities Regulatory
Commission of Ghana published the net metering rate
to guide the policy implementation. The Ghanaian gov-
ernment and energy sector agencies, however, continue
to express ambivalence on net metering system policy
implementation due to cyclical financial indebtedness
of its main electricity distributor, Electricity Company of
Ghana (ECG), and the state’s obsession with monopo-
lising the means of electricity generation and distribu-
tion. The ECG has refused to offset monthly electric-
ity bills of net-metered customers for over 5 years con-
trary to tariff regulations published by the public reg-
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ulatory commission of Ghana (Afful, in press; Boamah,
2020b). Beside financial considerations, the obstinacy of
the ECG has been attributed to the fact that power gen-
eration shortfalls between 2012 and 2016 and related
power supply instabilities—which reinforced the idea—
have been reversed with excess power generation capac-
ity of approximately 2400 megawatts after 2017; hence,
the policy has outlived its usefulness, at least in the
meantime (Boamah, 2020b). Players in the renewable en-
ergy sector and state energy agencies argue that since
the country does not feel morally obliged to promote
low-carbon energy solutions and does not have any po-
litical obligation to do so, decarbonisation of the sector
would be largely dependent upon the cost-effectiveness
of the technology (Boamah, 2020b). Reference to excess
power supply—although Ghana currently produces al-
most 70% of its power from fossil fuels—and financial
considerations, which are largely decisive of the electric-
ity system transition pathways, suggest that decarboni-
sation cannot be on the radar of relevant agencies until
it coincides with certain desirable conditions and emer-
gency situations.
Moreover, in other circumstances, self-organised en-
ergy initiatives imply that there are citizens who are
almost fully fending for themselves via self-financing
of power back-up systems, making direct negotiations
with private sector energy providers at exorbitant costs,
and/or depending on mini-grid electrification systems
(particularly in remote areas) with tariffs significantly
higher than that of conventional centralised electrical
grids while the state may have limited control over
the matter (Boamah, 2020a, 2020b). Although self-
organisation of decentralised electricity systems may
mitigate energy injustices and satisfy energy needs of
lower-class social groups in extreme areas of Kenya and
Namibia (Boamah, 2020b), it results in feelings of en-
trenched energy injustices and misrecognition partic-
ularly in countries like Ghana where individuals and
groups deem limited or no access to state-driven grid as
characteristic denial of privileges of national citizenship,
sometimes regardless of socio-economic status, class,
place of residence, and so on (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2020).
Even within Ghana, state-led decentralised solar PV elec-
trification produced conflicting responses regarding the
issue of justice: The government-sponsored free dissem-
ination of 500-Watt solar PV to off-grid communities cre-
ated a collective consciousness of misrecognition due
to the social preference for centralised grids, whereas a
50% subsidy of the same program for urban households
generated contrary feelings (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2018,
2020). The off-grid community had voted for the incum-
bent government in expectation for centralised electri-
cal grids and the offer of free solar PV systems was per-
ceived as misrecognition of citizenship rights when com-
pared with fellow Ghanaians living in grid-connected lo-
cations. This had been the case despite the widespread
outcry of injustices around dependencies on centralised
electricity provision (Boamah & Rothfuß, 2020). This is a
clear case of frustration born out of relative deprivation;
the disenchanted off-grid residents issued subtle threats
to vote against the ruling government during 2020 elec-
tion upon failure to provide electrical grids (Boamah &
Rothfuß, 2020). Self-organisation and the politics of elec-
tricity system transitions in contemporary Ghana shows
a situation where the quality of electricity supply and
spatiality of electrical grid access has been a driver and
sometimes an outcome of elections. Therefore, the or-
ganisation of energy infrastructure is intertwined with
multiple interests at different geographical scales—from
local to national.
Again, in the Republic of South Africa, the state-
sponsored Free Basic Electricity project increased en-
ergy access for lower-income groups and residents of
off-grid communities, and yet the energy output of de-
centralised solar PV systems was way below energy
needs of the population relative to the more privileged
groups who had access to more efficient and lower-cost
centralised electrical grids (Masekameni, Kasangana,
Makonese, & Mbonane, 2018; Monyei, Jenkins, et al.,
2018; Monyei, Adewumi, & Jenkins, 2018). Both state-
driven centralised electricity systems and decentralised
ones do not guarantee just outcomes; and neither do
self-organised decentralised systems offer satisfactory
remedy due to the above-mentioned contested enti-
tlement notions. The transition to self-organised, de-
centralised electrification systems in the Global South
is driven by quite different motivations in rather am-
biguous energy policy regulatory frameworks and pub-
lic ambivalence.
The transition is not any less seamless in the Global
North where regulatory mechanisms and clear incen-
tives exist. There are tensions in Germany as big energy
companies have been affected by state subsidies sup-
porting small scale self-organised grid-connected solar
PV installations. Experiences in Australia are even more
complex. The transition to net metering and battery en-
ergy storage systems in Australia have caused significant
reductions in grid electricity consumption (and hence re-
duced revenues of utilities) and yet the resultant peak
load demand reductions can, in certain situations, ad-
equately offset grid network investment costs (Passey
et al., 2018). Depending on the electricity regime, en-
ergy politics and other local conditions, frequent power
supply interruptions, poor access to centralised electrical
grids, and hikes in electricity tariffs present a comingling
of opportunities and challenges in the transition to self-
organised solar PV systems in Global South and Global
North countries.
Self-organised decentralised electricity provision is
decidedly reconfiguring the role of civil society organi-
sations and state actors in electricity regimes of Global
North and Global South countries. The conflicting view-
points about what a ‘desirable energy future’ should
look like and the governance structures to realise these
revolve around a choice between self-organised decen-
tralised systems—inclined towards renewable energy
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promotion, energy efficiency, autonomous and ‘demo-
cratic’ electricity provision by individuals/local entities—
traditional centralised systems (Schmid et al., 2017), or
the co-existence of both systems.
4. Locked between the Scylla of ‘Energy Bullying’ and
Charybdis of Decarbonisation Apathy
Concerns about a fair distribution of the benefits and bur-
dens of the energy system for all in society is certainly
a necessary call within the just energy transition de-
bate (see Jenkins, Sovacool, Błachowicz, & Lauer, 2020;
Healy & Barry, 2017; Newell &Mulvaney, 2013; Sovacool,
2014), but they are certainly bundled with some con-
straints too. The justice advocacy in the decarbonisa-
tion debate has placed huge political and moral obliga-
tions on the major emitters of carbon and this might
have obscured necessary contributions from least emit-
ters (predominantly in the Global South) who may suf-
fer from the brunt of climate extremes in the future.
According to Anderson et al. (2020), the planned car-
bon emission reductions of “climate progressive nations”
such as the UK and Sweden, will still exceed their fair
share of a Paris-compliant global carbon budget by at
least two times, and even in the UK where moderate
progress has been registered, emissions from interna-
tional aviation and shipping are excluded. Norway has
fully decarbonised its electricity sector and great strides
in the transition to electric cars suggest a big leap for-
ward, but these gains are still negated by huge carbon
emissions from its cash-cow (oil and gas sectors, aviation
and shipping industries). Calculations by Anderson et al.
(2020) show that an immediate 10–15% per year carbon
emission reduction target is required for Norway tomeet
its Paris-based temperature and equity commitments,
and this also requires a completely zero-carbon energy
system in the shipping and aviation industry by 2035.
President Trump blatantly flouted the Paris Agreement,
repealed anti-fossil regulations to revive coal mining in-
dustry in the USA—to honour electioneering promises
in 2016—even in the face of evidence suggesting that
the coal mining industry and coal jobs decline occurred
three decades earlier and that mining workers have be-
come accustomed to transitioning to alternative liveli-
hoods (Sanya, Evans, & Konisky, 2018). President Trump
claims adherence to the Paris Climate Agreement could
endanger the US economy which thrives on massive pro-
duction and consumption of fossil fuels, and that he
can backtrack this position on the condition that rene-
gotiation of the terms of the agreement is deemed fair
to the American economy and workers. The date of
formal withdrawal (4 November 2019) is in contraven-
tion of the terms of agreement which prohibits termi-
nation earlier than three years from the effective start
date of the agreement by the signatory—which was
4 November 2016 for the USA under the administration
of former President Obama. In other words, the earliest
permissible withdrawal date must be after 4 November
2020, but President Trump flouted the agreement out
of politics against de-fossilisation. Therefore, decarbon-
isation initiatives and the set timelines in the Global
North can be nothing more than wishful thinking due
to the obvious negative impacts they may have on the
economies of these wealthier nations and other vested
interests around continuous burning of fossil fuels. Lock-
in syndromes reinforce energy bullying behaviour in even
wealthy and ‘ecologically guilty’ countries, as for coun-
tries in the Global South, it reinforces the stance in which
they, understandably, do not feel morally obliged to
make strenuous commitments to low-carbon energy so-
lutions. The fact that many least-developed countries in
vulnerable geographies (e.g., Indonesia, Bangladesh, and
Sahelian countries) lack the wherewithal to make effec-
tive climate change adaptation—in contrast to wealthy
western countries—reveals the weaknesses of the just
transition framework. The skewed attention to the dis-
tribution obligations of causative agents without analy-
sis of primary victims of climate extremes may mislead
some Global South countries to sit aloof and continue
with business as usual. In fact, carbon emission statis-
tics of newly industrialising countries (e.g., Brazil, South
Africa, Indonesia, China, and India) place them in the
same league of ‘heavy emitters’ as the wealthy western
countries or sometimes even higher (e.g., China). Hence,
Global North’s energy bullying practices cannot justify ig-
noring the issue of decarbonisation. Of course, technical,
financial, and other forms of support from the Global
North are required to equip climate mitigation efforts,
on just grounds, but the obsession with justice consid-
erations may stall decarbonisation initiatives in the elec-
tricity sector. The just energy transition perspective can
thus be not only enabling and but also constraining.
5. Final Reflections and Unresolved Questions Needing
Attention
The thematic issue has sought to explore emerging tech-
nological, geographical and political trends in different
regions of the world as our electricity systems are clearly
moving away from the centralized, utility-based, and
state-controlled power generation models. No matter
how hard opponents may try, a paradigm shift in cen-
tralised electricity systems toward self-organised decen-
tralised electricity systems is inevitable be it now or in
the future. The shift is a result of a combination of moti-
vations and the relevance of the driving forces shaped by
changing circumstances, which are both predictable and
unpredictable in specific geographies. The consequences
and drivers of electricity transitions are so variable and
mixed that attempts to provide blueprints may give rise
to new lock-ins. Predicting the trajectory of the transi-
tion pathways and governing it towards desirable out-
comes are still complicated given the uniqueness of elec-
tricity regimes within specific countries, the varying lev-
els of national economic development, different state
priorities, and ever-changing energy visions of electricity
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consumers. Even though the direction and governance
mode of electricity transition systems necessary for the
realisation of decarbonisation targets are not far-fetched,
the pathways that offer just outcomes make electricity
system transitions amorphous adventures. We cannot
pretend to have settled these issues, but our contribu-
tion could perhaps be enhanced by raising some refresh-
ing questions in the hope of informing future research.
These include, but are not limited to, the following:
• What are the possibilities for countries of the
Global North that have developed excellent cen-
tralised electricity systems to make a switch to
more flexible and modular energy systems which
are predicted to be the dominant model of
the future?
• Are Global North countries witnessing a path de-
pendence leading to unforeseen institutional con-
sequences where countries like the UK—with its
highly centralised electricity system—are now fac-
ing bigger challenges in making the transition to
more flexible and sustainable energy systems com-
pared to countries like Denmark and Germany
where stronger elements of decentralised electric-
ity generation have been maintained?
• Does transition to a decentralised electricity sys-
tem create the necessary preparatory grounds
to mitigate entrenched energy injustices in the
Global South, or does it rather create a dual system
where commercial and rich consumers could man-
age their own energy needs while a less efficient
public electricity system is left to serve the poor?
• Should the framing of the electricity system transi-
tion debate be shifted from justice issues to prag-
matic challenges awaiting residents in vulnerable
geographies?
• Does self-organisation of energy and unpre-
dictable outcomes complement or destabilise the
dominant electricity systems and state capacity?
Acknowledgments
We sincerely appreciate inputs by Prof. Jan Froestad
(University of Bergen) on an earlier version of this
proposal. Many thanks also to Editors of Politics and
Governance (Raquel Silva and Tiago Cardoso) for their
great support throughout the entire publication process.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Afful, J. (in press). Net-metering system, subtle corrupt
practices & energy (in)justices in Ghana (Unpub-
lished Masters dissertation). University of Bayreuth,
Bayreuth, Germany.
Anderson, K., Broderick, J. F., & Stoddard, I. (2020). A
factor of two: How the mitigation plans of ‘climate
progressive’ nations fall far short of Paris-compliant
pathways. Climate Policy. Advance online publication.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2020.1728209
Atkinson, R., Dörfler, T., & Rothfuß, E. (2018). Self-
organisation and the co-production of governance:
The challenge of local responses to climate change.
Politics and Governance, 6(1), 169–179.
Bach, L., Hopkins, D., & Stephenson, J. (2020). Solar elec-
tricity cultures: Household adoption dynamics and
energy policy in Switzerland. Energy Research and So-
cial Science, 63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.
101395
Banal-Estañol, A., Calzada, J., & Jordana, J. (2017). How to
achieve full electrification: Lessons from Latin Amer-
ica. Energy Policy, 108, 55–69.
Bisaga, I., & Parikh, P. (2018). To climb or not to climb? In-
vestigating energy use behaviour among solar home
system adopters through energy ladder and social
practice lens. Energy Research & Social Science, 44,
293–303.
Boamah, F. (2020a). Emerging low-carbon energy land-
scapes and energy innovation dilemmas in the
Kenyan periphery. Annals of the American Associa-
tion of Geographers, 110(1), 145–165.
Boamah, F. (2020b). Desirable or debatable? Putting
Africa’s decentralised solar energy futures in context.
Energy Research and Social Science, 62, 1–9.
Boamah, F. (in press). Self-organisation of solar photo-
voltaic electrification, social practices, and energy
justice in Ghana and Kenya (Unpublished Habilita-
tion Dissertation). University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth,
Germany.
Boamah, F., & Rothfuß, E. (2018). From technical inno-
vations towards social practices and socio-technical
transition? Re-thinking the transition to decen-
tralised solar PV electrification in Africa. Energy Re-
search and Social Science, 42, 1–10.
Boamah, F., & Rothfuß, E. (2020). Practical recognition
as a suitable pathway for researching just energy fu-
tures: Seeing like a modern electricity user in Ghana.
Energy Research and Social Science, 60, 1–12.
Boonstra, B. (2015). Planning strategies in an age of ac-
tive citizenship: A post-structuralist agenda for self-
organization in spatial planning. Groningen: Univer-
sity of Groningen.
Boonstra, B., & Boelens, L. (2011). Self-organisation in
urban development: Towards a new perspective on
spatial planning. Urban Research and Practice, 4(2),
99–122.
Bouffard, F., & Kirschen, D. S. (2008). Centralised and
distributed electricity systems. Energy Policy, 36(12),
4504–4508.
Brisbois, M. C. (2019). Powershifts: A framework for as-
sessing the growing impact of decentralized owner-
ship of energy transitions on political decision-making.
Energy Research and Social Science, 50, 151–161.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 170
Bulkeley, H., Powells, G., & Bell, S. (2016). Smart grids and
the constitution of solar electricity conduct. Environ-
ment and Planning A, 48(1), 7–23.
de Wildt, T. E., Chappin, E. J. L., van de Kaa, G., Herder,
P. M., & van de Poel, I. R. (2020). Conflicted by de-
carbonisation: Five types of conflict at the nexus of
capabilities and decentralised energy systems identi-
fied with an agent-based model. Energy Research &
Social Science, 64, 1–22.
Dharshing, S. (2017). Household dynamics of technology
adoption: A spatial econometric analysis of residen-
tial solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in Germany. En-
ergy Research & Social Science, 23, 113–124.
Didiza, S., Tshehla, M., Radmore, J., Kotzen, K., & Raw,
B. (2016). Energy services: Energy efficiency and em-
bedded generation—2016market intelligence report.
Cape Town: GreenCape.
Dolunay, O. (2020). Geostrategic renewable energy tran-
sition in Turkey: Organizational strategies towards an
energy autonomous future. Politics and Governance,
8(3), 199–210.
Europe Beyond Coal. (2019). Overview: National coal
phase-out announcements in Europe. Europe Be-




Geels, F. W., Sovacool, B., & Sorell, S. (2018). Of emer-
gence, diffusion, and impact: A sociotechnical per-
spective on researching energy demand. In K. E. H.
Jenkins & D. Hopkins (Eds.), Transitions in energy ef-
ficiency and demand: The emergence, diffusion and
impact of low-carbon innovation (pp. 15–33). 	Abing-
don: Routledge.
Hasanov, M., & Beaumont, J. (2016). The value of col-
lective intentionality for understanding urban self-
organization. Urban Research & Practice, 9(3), 1–19.
Hasanov, M., & Zuidema, C. (2018). The transforma-
tive power of self-organization: Towards a conceptual
framework for understanding local energy initiatives
in the Netherlands. Energy Research and Social Sci-
ence, 37, 85–93.
Healy, N., & Barry, J. (2017). Politicizing energy justice
and energy system transitions: Fossil fuel divestment
and a “just transition.” Energy Policy, 108, 451–459.
Inderberg, T. H. J. (2020). Centrally decentralising?
Analysing key policies and pathways in Norway’s
electricity transitions. Politics and Governance, 8(3),
173–184.
Inderberg, T. H. J., Tews, K., & Turner, B. (2018). Explor-
ing household solar energy development in Germany,
Norway, and the United Kingdom. Energy Research
and Social Science, 42, 258–269.
International Energy Agency. (2020). CO2 emissions
from fuel combustion: Overview 2020. International
Energy Agency. Retrieved from https://www.iea.
org/reports/co2-emissions-from-fuel-combustion-
overview
Jenkins, K. E. H., Sovacool, B. K., Błachowicz, A., &
Lauer, A. (2020). Politicising the just transition: Link-
ing global climate policy, nationally determined con-
tributions and targeted research agendas. Geoforum,
115, 138–142.
Joas, H. (1996). The creativity of action. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Klagge, B., Greiner, C., Greven, D., & Nweke-Eze, C.
(2020). Cross-scale linkages of centralized electricity
generation: Geothermal development and investor–
community relations in Kenya. Politics and Gover-
nance, 8(3), 211–222.
Masekameni, D. M., Kasangana, K. K., Makonese, T., &
Mbonane T. P. (2018). Dissemination of free basic
electricity in low-income settlements. In 2018 Inter-
national Conference on the Domestic Use of Energy
(DUE). https://doi.org/10.23919/DUE.2018.8384380
Meerkerk, I., van Boonstra, B., & Edelenbos, J. (2013).
Self-organization in urban regeneration: A two-case
comparative research. European Planning Studies,
21(10), 1630–1652.
Monyei, C. G., Adewumi, A., & Jenkins, K. (2018). Energy
(in)justice in off-grid rural electrification policy: South
Africa in focus. Energy Research and Social Science,
44, 152–171.
Monyei, C. G., Jenkins, K., Serestina, V., & Adewumi, A. O.
(2018). Examining energy sufficiency and energy mo-
bility in the global south through the energy justice
framework. Energy Policy, 119, 68–76.
Nederhand, J., Bekkers, V., & Voorberg, W. (2016). Self-
Organization and the role of government: How and
why does self-organization evolve in the shadow
of hierarchy? Public Management Review, 18(7),
1063–1084.
Newell, P., & Mulvaney, D. (2013). The political economy
of the “just transition.” Geographical Journal, 179(2),
132–140.
Osička, J., Kemmerzell, J., Zoll, M., Lehotsky, L., Černoch,
F. & Knodt, M. (2020). What’s next for the European
coal heartland? Exploring the future of coal as pre-
sented in German, Polish and Czech press. Energy Re-
search and Social Science, 61, 1–27.
Parag, Y., & Sovacool, B. (2016). Electricity market de-
sign for the prosumer era. Nature Energy, 1(4), 1–6.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.32
Passey, R., Watt, M., Bruce, A., & MacGill, I. (2018). Who
pays, who benefits? The financial impacts of solar
photovoltaic systems and air-conditioners on Aus-
tralian households. Energy Research & Social Science,
39, 198–215.
Pyman, M., & Boamah, F. (2019). Usain Bolt’ meters:
Reform successes in the electricity sector can be
quick, but only the failures get reported. ACE Global
Integrity. Retrieved from https://ace.globalintegrity.
org/usain-bolt
Razzaq, S., Zafar, R., Khan, N. A., Butt, A. R., & Mahmood,
A. (2016). A novel Prosumer-Based Energy Sharing
and Management (PESM) approach for cooperative
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 171
Demand Side Management (DSM) in smart grid. Ap-
plied Science, 6(10), 275.
Rothfuß, E., & Korff, R. (2015). Urban self-organisation in
the global south: The everyday life of the poor as a
collective resource to enhance the politics of sustain-
ability. In D. Wilson (Ed.), The politics of the urban
sustainability concept (pp. 152–166). Champaign, IL:
Common Ground Publishing.
Sanya, C., Evans, T. P., & Konisky, D. M. (2018). Adapta-
tion, culture, and the energy transition in American
coal country. Energy Research and Social Science, 37,
133–139.
Schmid, E., Pechan, A., Mehnert, M., & Eisenack, K.
(2017). Imagine all these futures: On heterogeneous
preferences and mental models in the German en-
ergy transition. Energy Research and Social Science,
27, 45–56.
Sovacool, B. K. (2014). What are we doing here?
Analysing 15 years of energy scholarship and propos-
ing a social science research agenda. Energy Research
and Social Science, 1 1–29.
Sovacool, B. K., Lipson,M.M., & Chard, R. (2019). Tempo-
rality, vulnerability, and energy justice in household
low carbon innovations. Energy Policy, 128, 495–504.
Sovacool, B. K., & Walter, G. (2019). Internationaliz-
ing the political economy of hydroelectricity: Secu-
rity, development and sustainability in hydropower
states. Review of International Political Economy,
26(1), 49–79.
Strengers, Y. (2013). Smart energy technologies in
everyday life: Smart utopia? Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Strengers, Y., Pink, S., & Nicholls, L. (2019). Smart energy
futures and social practice imaginaries: Forecasting
scenarios for pet care in Australian homes. Energy Re-
search and Social Science, 48, 108–115.
Taylor, D., Turner, S., Willette, D., & Uawithya, P. (2015).
De-centralized electricity in Africa and Southeast
Asia: Issues and solutions. Dublin: Accenture Devel-




Unruh, G. C. (2002). Escaping carbon lock-in. Energy Pol-
icy, 30, 317–325.
Van der Merwe, M. (2017). Energy transitions: The case
of South African electric security (Unpublished Doc-
toral Dissertation). University of Cape Town, Cape
Town, South Africa.
World Bank. (2019). Tracking SDG-7: The energy progress




Zafar, R., Mahmood, A., Razzaq, S., Ali, W., Naeem, U.,
& Shehzad, K. (2018). Prosumer based energy man-
agement and sharing in smart grid. Renewable and
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 82, 1675–1684.
Zink, R., Valdes, J., & With, J. (2020). Prioritizing the
Chicken or Egg? Electric Vehicle Purchase and Charg-
ing Infrastructure Subsidies in Germany. Politics and
Governance, 8(3), 185–198.
About the Authors
Eberhard Rothfuß is Professor of Social and Population Geography at the University of Bayreuth. He
received his doctorate 2003 at the University of Würzburg and qualified as a Post-Doctoral Fellow at
the University of Passau until 2010. During the period 2011–2013, he represented the Chair of Social
Geography and Geographical Development Research at the University of Bonn. His main areas of re-
search focus on urban and regional governance, development geography, critical theory, and qualita-
tive methodologies.
Festus Boamah is an Assistant Professor and Post-Doctoral Fellow (“Habilitation”) at the Chair of
Social and Population Geography, University of Bayreuth. He obtained his Masters and PhD degrees
in Development Geography from the University of Bergen and BA degree in Geography & Resource
Development from the University of Ghana. His earlier research focused on livelihood impacts of bio-
fuel ‘land grabbing’ in Ghana. His recent research focuses on self-organisation of solar photovoltaic
electrification, social practices and energy justice in Ghana and Kenya.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 3, Pages 162–172 172
